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In this work we review the security vulnerability of Quantum Cryptography with respect to
”man-in-the-middle attacks” and the standard authentication methods applied to counteract these
attacks. We further propose a modified authentication algorithm which features higher efficiency
with respect to consumption of mutual secret bits.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) or ”quantum cryp-
tography” is a Quantum Mechanics based cryptographic
primitive which, in principle, holds the potential of ab-
solutely secure communication that cannot be compro-
mised by any eavesdropping technique. The strength of
the QKD primitive is the unconditionally secure simul-
taneous generation of two identical bit streams at two
distinct locations which subsequently could be used as a
key in symmetric (unconditionally or computationally se-
cure) encryption schemes. However, it is well known that
QKD requires a public channel with trusted integrity as
otherwise a potential adversary (Eve) can easily mount
a ”man-in-the-middle attack”. In case the eavesdropper
can manipulate messages on the public channel there is
no way to guarantee that in the course of a QKD pro-
tocol the two legitimate communication parties (Alice
and Bob) are really exchanging the messages they are
sending to each other. Eve can simply cut the quan-
tum channel and subsequently communicate over both
the quantum and the public channels with Bob as if she
would be Alice and with Alice as if she would be Bob.
Eventually, she would thus share two independent keys
with the two legitimate parties and gain full control of
all the subsequently transmitted encrypted information
without being noticed at all. The described type of attack
can be counteracted by authenticating the QKD protocol
messages transmitted over the public channel. Basically
public key authentication methods and symmetric key
authentication methods can be used (see Ref. [1] for a
discussion of the relative merits and drawbacks of these
methods). It is however straightforward to notice that
unconditionally secure key generation by means of QKD
is only feasible if it is combined with methods providing
unconditionally secure authentication. Standard public
key methods are automatically ruled out if one would
stick to this requirement as the latter are only computa-
tionally secure and potentially subject to cryptanalysis
by means of quantum computers. Therefore, already in
Ref. [2] it was proposed to use unconditionally secure
symmetric message authentication methods as e.g. de-
veloped in Ref. [3] to ensure the integrity of the public
channel. The main idea of the application of these meth-
ods in QKD is to intertwine the transcript of the pub-
lic channel communication with an independent secret,
which the two legitimate parties share and on this basis
provide a mechanism for authenticating this communica-
tion. Alice and Bob need therefore an initial secret key,
which they use only once. Subsequently in each QKD
session they repeatedly renew the mutual secret by re-
serving part of the newly generated key. This key is to
be used for channel authentication purposes in the next
session. This paradigm has been elaborated in subse-
quent publications[4, 5]. It should be noted that while
thus the unconditional security of QKD is retained, it is
basically degraded from a secret key generation scheme
in the strict sense to a secret key growing technique.
In what follows we restrict our discussion to symmet-
ric key message authentication methods and, similar to
Wegman and Carter[3], base our approach on strongly
universal2 functions. In Section 2 we discuss a general
method for producing message authentication tags using
only a moderate amount of the secret key. In Section 3
we briefly discuss the details of the authentication algo-
rithm in relation to the QKD protocol. We also present
a modular integrated software library implementing full
scale QKD-protocols including public channel authenti-
cation used in the framework of a recent quantum cryp-
tographic experiment[6].
MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION PRIMITIVE
A broad class of unconditionally secure symmetric key
message authentication approaches follow the method de-
scribed in Ref. [3]. This method is independent of the
context in which authentication is applied and therefore
we refer to it in what follows as the authentication prim-
itive. Before discussing the primitive itself we shortly re-
view the foundations of message authentication by means
of a family of strongly universal2 functions. Let HA be
such a family of functions which maps the set of all mes-
sages A, typically the set of binary strings of length m,
2to the set of all authentication tags B, typically the set
of binary strings of length n < m. One can then au-
thenticate a message by sending an authentication tag
in addition to the message itself over the communication
channel. An adversary willing to manipulate the original
message must also be able to produce the proper tag for
the manipulated message. The authentication system is
unbreakable with probability p when B is chosen to have
at least 1/p elements[3]. The term ”unbreakable with
probability p” is used in the following sense: If a message
from l∈A yields a tag t∈B through a randomly chosen
function f∈HA, t = f(l), and if an eavesdropper knows
m and t but not f , she has only a probability lower than
p to find the proper tag t′ of a different message l′, with
respect to f , t′ = f(l′). The legitimate parties share
a secret key, which is used as an index in the function
space HA. In this sense the secret sharing is symmetric.
The secret can be used only once. The problem with this
basic approach is that most of the well known families
of strongly universal2 functions are typically larger than
the space of all messages. Therefore, the key needed to
authenticate a message is longer than the message itself.
This is a particular problem in quantum cryptography,
where the key growth factor directly depends on the por-
tion of generated key, reserved for a subsequent authen-
tication. While it is necessary to minimize the length of
the messages to be authenticated as discussed in Section
3, it is also strongly desirable to restrict the space of ap-
plied hash functions, reduce the secure key consumption
for authentication purposes and thus get efficient authen-
tication methods. At the expense of increasing the ”se-
curity parameter” p to 2p, Wegman and Carter propose
a method for building a relatively restricted family of
almost strongly universal2 hash functions[3], which uses
a basic class of strongly universal2 hash functions into
intermediate spaces as a kernel. Wegman and Carter
choose a specific multiplicative family of hash functions
(denoted as H1 in Ref. [7]), to map strings of length 2s
to those of length s, where
s = n+ log2log2m . (1)
Note that by definition the cardinality of this class,
being a function of s, only slowly grows with m. The
original message l is then divided into substrings of a
defined length 2s and a randomly chosen hash function
from the mentioned class is applied to the substrings.
The set of resulting tags is then concatenated to pro-
duce an intermediate message. The latter is then once
again subdivided into substrings of the length 2s and a
new hash function from the described family is applied
to each string. This process is applied until only one tag
remains. The lower order n bits are taken for the final
authentication tag t. One can show[3] that this method
defines an almost strongly universal2 family of functions
from A onto B. Wegman and Carter also prove that the
key length needed to index this family is
k = 4slog2m . (2)
This method constitutes a general primitive for sym-
metric key authentication. The definition f of the almost
strongly universal2 class of hash functions is independent
of the underlying kernel class of intermediate strongly
universal2 functions and any such class can be used. The
authentication of the public channel in QKD discussed so
far in literature (see e.g. Refs. [2], [5] and [8]) are almost
exclusively based on the discussed primitive developed in
Ref. [3], including the choice of the basic intermediate
class of strongly universal2 (2s to s) hash functions. It
is obvious that this method is suitable for authenticating
long messages. As an example, for authentication tags
which are 64 bits long the message length exceeds the key
length if the former is longer than 3138 Bits. For mes-
sages longer than 20000 Bits the message length exceeds
the key lengths already by a factor of four. However, in
certain settings, and in particular in the QKD case, it is
highly relevant to have an efficient authentication prim-
itive also for short messages. To this end we propose a
new primitive, which includes a two step procedure. First
of all one maps the initial message l from A to Z, where
Z is the set of all binary strings of length r (m > r > n),
by means of a single publicly known hash function f0 so
that z = f0(l). The second step is a direct application
of the basic approach as discussed above. One sends m
over the communication channel alongside with t = f(z),
where f is a randomly chosen secret strongly universal2
hash function from HZ mapping Z onto B. We discuss
first the security of this primitive and then assess the
amount of secret key needed for its implementation. The
security of the primitive is given by the probability p of
an adversary to produce a proper authentication tag for
a modified message (cf. the discussion above). Obviously
p = p1 + p2 , p2 = 1/|B| . (3)
Here, p2 is the probability for the eavesdropper to
break the strongly universal2 family HZ (see Ref. [3])
while p1 is the probability that the initial message and
the modified message yield the same tag q under the cho-
sen fixed hash function f0:
p1 = maxl
(
Pr{f0(l) = f0(l
′)|l 6= l′}
)
. (4)
Clearly all messages A0 = f
−1
0 (z) yield the same au-
thentication tag z and thus
p1 = maxl
(
Pr
{
l′∈A¯0 = {A0\ l}
})
. (5)
3In case A0 is independent of the choice of l and all l
are equally probable (the distribution of meaningful mes-
sages in the space of all bit strings is uniform) then
p1 = (|A|/|Z| − 1)/|A| < 1/|Z| for all values of |A|,
p < 1/|B|+ 1/|Z| . (6)
In addition to the two basic assumptions in the deriva-
tion of expression Eq.(6) one should note that we implic-
itly assume that the message l′ is random and fixed, i.e.
the eavesdropper can not chose the manipulation mes-
sage at will. While this can not be taken for granted in
general, in the case of man-in-the-middle attacks in quan-
tum cryptography l an l′ are definitely randomly and in-
dependently fixed beside the scope of influence of the ad-
versary. (In this case of a man-in-the middle attack l and
l′ are protocol extracts from the communication between
Alice and Eve and Eve and Bob respectively, whereby
these are generated through physical random processes
and Eve has no opportunity at all to change either l or
l′.) The assumption that A0 is independent from l can
be guaranteed by any suitably chosen
hash function that constitutes a homomorphism of A
onto Z. Finally the assumption of an uniform distribu-
tion of all possible messages depends on the choice of the
protocol extracts and can not always be granted. How-
ever, one can initially perform a uniform randomizing
operation e.g. by means of XORing the message l with a
completely random bit string of the same dimension. The
latter can be obtained by means of deterministic pseudo-
random generator whereby a number of secret bits from
the joint secret are used for the seed. The application
of other appropriate uniform randomizers, possibly inte-
grated in the definition of f0, is also feasible.
We would now point out that the secret key needed
in this approach is exactly the number of bits needed to
index the family HZ . Obviously if r (the dimension of Z)
is chosen to be moderate and an appropriate restricted
strongly universal2 class is selected then the amount of
secret key required can also be reduced. To estimate this
amount exactly one needs to specify the function family
applied. We choose the set of affine transformations:
HZ(·) = {f = (Φ, β)|Φ− all (r×m) binary
Toeplitz matrices;β − all (m×1) binary vectors} ,
f(z) = Φz + β mod(2) . (7)
This function family[9, 10] is strongly universal2 as
shown in Ref. [10] and is indexed by r + 2 × n − 1 pa-
rameters. For r=256 and n=64, obviously the message
length exceeds the required secret key already for strings
longer than 384 bits. In contrast to the primitive used by
Wegman and Carter this amount is constant by definition
and does not increase with m.
PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION
In Section 2 above we have only given a general de-
scription of a new primitive suitable for authentication
in QKD settings, leaving the question of the exact pro-
tocol extracts to be authenticated completely aside. It
is beyond the scope of the present paper to address this
topic in detail. This issue has been however thoroughly
discussed in Refs. [4] and [5]. Certainly an authenti-
cation of the full protocol transcript is one (inefficient)
extreme possibility. In Ref. [5] it is shown that authenti-
cating the sifting phase discussion and the results of the
error correction phase is sufficient. In this reference it
is also suggested that (the relevant parts) of the tran-
script are not authenticated at once but rather the bit
strings to be authenticated are separately processed as
soon as they are generated in the respective QKD proto-
col phases. A particular advantage of this approach with
respect to the cryptographic primitive proposed in Sec-
tion 2 above, is that all the bit strings to be authenticated
are randomly and uniformly distributed in the space of
all possible strings of corresponding dimension. Thus, if
this protocol is employed, an initial randomization is not
required for a secure application the primitive described
above.
We have implemented an authentication algorithm
based on the primitive presented in this paper, whereby,
provisionally, SHA is used as the initial hash function.
This algorithm is a part of a constantly developed mod-
ular software-set up, which is integrated in the framework
of an embedded general purpose QKD hardware-software
prototype dedicated to data acquisition and subsequent
QKD-protocol processing and data encryption (currently
AES and One Time Pad are implemented). A public
demonstration of the functionality of this QKD prototype
together with an optic segment implementing entangled-
photon key generation took recently place in the form of a
”Q-Banking” transaction, which was carried out between
two buildings in Vienna, Austria - the Rathaus (city hall)
and the seat of Bank Austria Creditanstalt[6]. The cur-
rent version of the software set-up is designed in the form
of a C library ”QKD III” which allows application by
choice of alternative quantum-acquisition protocols, er-
ror correction, privacy amplification and authentication
algorithms and can alternatively be compiled for usage in
PC or embedded environments. The QKD protocol im-
plemented, in contrast to an earlier version used in the
”Q-Banking” experiment, follows the approach suggested
in Ref. [5]. This protocol is prone by design against a
potential loophole in this earlier version. The latter is
discussed in detail in Ref. [11].
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